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Introduction
This  research  note  explores  the  evolution  of  organised  crime  groups  (OCGs)  in  a
globalised  world.  It  does  not  seek  to  engage  with  the  current  literature  on  mafia
mobility  (Varese,  2011;  Sciarrone,  2009,  2014);  nor  does  it  present  new  empirical
evidence on transnational  illegal  trafficking (Albanese  and Reichel,  2013).  Instead it
proposes a model  that attempts to advance our understanding of  OCGs as  a major
international actor.
The hypotheses to this paper are the following. The first claims that, in the post-
bipolar world, the state is no longer the centre of  the political universe (Sassen, 2007).
The  spread  of  globalisation  has  produced  a  spatial  revolution  and  a  rescaling  of
authority (Brenner, 2004). On the one hand, globalisation incentivises the development
of  supranational organisations which claim the legitimate authority to produce norms
and make them effective (the subsidiarity principle of  the European Union is a proper
example), or which presume to enforce models of  social and economic development (this
is the case for the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank). At the same time,
however,  globalisation  also  revitalises  local  authorities,  both  at  regional  and  urban
levels, who assert growing powers of  tax collection and the use of  force, and claim to be
the best spokesmen for the rights and privileges of  their citizens. 
The second hypothesis suggests that the dispersion of  state prerogatives induced by
globalisation  is  further  advanced  or  encouraged  by  the  same  states,  which  seek  to
externalise the growing and unsustainable costs of  their apparatus—from welfare to
security, both domestic and foreign. In particular, the privatisation of  the use of  force
has reinstalled “naked violence” as the main instrument for the allocation of  resources.
Especially since the end of  the Cold War, internecine wars have redrawn the geography
of  political  groups,  multiplying  the  number  of  those  who  successfully  gain  violent
control of  specific territories at the sub-state level. In other words, the state is not the
involuntary,  sacrificial  victim  of  this  growing  fragmentation  of  power,  which  has
produced a plethora of  old and new non-state actors— such as gangs and mafia clans,
terrorists, and mercenaries (Davis, 2010). On the contrary, even democratic regimes now
deliberately sub-contract increasingly significant portions of  their own monopoly on
force to private corporations (Avant,  2005; Singer,  2003).  And governments’  attitude
towards  non-state  actors  is  ever  more  frequently  that  of  an  informal  devolution of
authority or even the development of  relationships of  a collusive nature. 
The third and final hypothesis contends that OCGs are eroding the state’s power
and  penetrating  legitimate  businesses  more  than  terrorists  and  private  military
corporations (Armao, 2003; Finckenauer, 2005). OCGs can easily employ violence (and
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the threat of  violence) to fight their enemies, secure their organisation, protect their
illegal enterprises, and curtail free competition in the market. And, at the same time,
they  can  count  on  their  dirty  money  to  feed  corruption  at  every  level  and  to  fuel
international financial circuits. OCGs represents a risk for society, but also a resource, in
that  they  respond  to  the  demand  for  illicit  goods  and  services  from  politicians,
entrepreneurs, and mere consumers.
One  additional  preliminary  observation  should  be  made,  which  concerns  the
working definition of  OCGs adopted in this paper. As part of  a broader category of
violent non-state actors,  OCGs are  defined as a structured and permanent group of
individuals who use violence to gain profit through criminal activities. In this way—at
least theoretically— OCGs distinguish themselves both from terrorist groups that use
violence to gain power and from contractors of  the modern military corporations for
whom  violence  is  a  (mostly  legal)  source  of  revenue.  As  with  most  academic
classifications, these groups, so clear-cut on paper, show some blurring of  the edges in
real-life contexts. Mafia organisations, for example, actively seek and pursue power; just
as  many  terrorist  groups  do  not  shy  from  financing  their  activities  through  illicit
enterprises (such as drug trafficking) that are traditionally associated with OCGs; and
just as, on the other hand, many private military corporations end up assuming, either
directly  or  indirectly,  a  leading  political  role  in  the  conflicts  in  which  they  find
themselves involved. The fact remains, however, that OCGs are distinguished by their
characteristic desire to intervene directly in the economic sphere in a criminal manner,
and through the threat or use of  violence. In this way, OCGs assume an explicit role in
the dynamics of  globalisation. This role offers OCGs a competitive advantage over the
state—from  violence  and  corruption  to  the  systematic  infiltration  of  public
administration and legitimate economy. In other words, OCGs incessantly reproduce the
violent accumulation of  resources at local levels,  and then invest their profits in the
global  market.  In  this  sense,  they  combine  local  and  global  dimensions  (power  and
market)  much  better  than  the  state.  Indeed,  it  is  true  that  globalisation  may  also
encourage the expansion of  domestic and international control efforts,  as well  as of
cross-border police collaboration (Friman and Andreas,  1999).  But states still cannot
ignore the prerogatives of  state sovereignty and the constraints imposed by democratic
procedures, whereas OCGs can.
This research note describes a three-step process. The first section analyses how
globalisation has promoted the process of  state deconstruction that has offered OCGs
new opportunities. The second section provides more detail about the power structure
of  OCGs, highlighting the aspects which make these groups the privileged partners of
capitalism.  The last  section represents an initial  attempt at  elaborating a  model  for
analysing OCGs based on two variables drawn from the literature on industrial clusters:
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the degree of  structuralisation and life cycles. The conclusion proposes a road map for
future research by combining the two variables in a matrix-like table.
Globalisation and deconstruction of  the state
The historical-social genesis of  the modern state has been analysed from a variety of
perspectives by a number of  scholars. Many have pointed out the different patterns (and
timing)  that  the  processes  of  state  formation  have  followed  in  different  territorial
contexts. State-building did take different forms and followed diverging (and in some
ways revealing) patterns according to whether the burgeoning state in question was a
great power or one without particular hegemonic ambitions; a continental or an insular
power; an agricultural society or one open to innovation and industrialisation. Despite
all  of  these  variants,  it  is  useful  to  sketch  out  the  trend lines  of  development;  the
constants, so to say, of  the evolution of  the modern state. The first common element is
the  so-called  process  of  monopolisation:  the  construction  of  a  centralised  military,
judicial, and administrative apparatus (Elias, 1993). In the various territorial contexts,
what changes is the mixture of  coercion and co-opting that the sovereign adopts in
order to successfully absorb the diverse and numerous pre-existing political units which,
until that moment, have been able to exercise their own sovereignty independently: city,
dioceses, principate, and so on (Tilly, 1990).
The second essential element common to different experiences of  state-building—
and  the  one  far  less  studied  by  scholars—is  the  gradual  passage  from a  relatively
“private”  monopoly  to  one  that  is  “public”  (Elias,  1993).  The  more  resources  the
sovereign accumulates, the more dependent he becomes on the services and functions of
those who materially contribute to the procurement of  these resources; and the more he
finds himself  forced to redistribute revenues among the social forces that sustain him.
At first, the sovereign needs to only concern himself  with his functionaries and other
court nobles, but as soon the middle class begins to represent the country’s main source
of  wealth, he must grant its sons access to the court as well. This is accomplished, for
instance, through the sale of  noble titles which allow the sovereign to profit from the
middle class’s legitimate aspirations for social advancement. It is this unique form of
economic exchange what marks the beginning of  the historical collaboration between
the state and capitalism. 
In short, state-building may be expressed as a four-phase process. The first phase is
that of  the political, economic, and cultural unification of  the upper class. The second
phase sees the incorporation of  the masses thanks to such factors as the universalisation
of  military service, compulsory education, and the emergence of  new forms of  mass
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communication.  The  third  phase  is  characterised  by  the  active  participation  of  the
masses  in  the  political  system  through  increased  enfranchisement  and  the  birth  of
modern political  parties.  And, finally,  the fourth phase witnesses the construction of
public welfare made possible by progressive taxation and the reallocation of  resources
to disadvantaged social classes and the least developed regions (Rokkan, 1999).
The process of  globalisation, reinforced in the end of  the Cold War induced an
inversion of  this state-building process and a reformulation of  the four phases. The first
phase  witnesses  the  deconstruction  of  the  centralised  state  and  the  rebirth  of
autonomous centres of  coercive power into forms that, depending on the context, range
from  simple  administrative  decentralisation  to  the  assertion  of  functions  such  as
military recruitment, tax collection, the management of  basic services, as well as the
right to represent the interests, privileges (and even the values) of  those who fall under
their dominion. The second phase is defined by the expulsion from the socio-political
system of  ever-greater  sectors  of  the  masses;  people  who  are  denied  all  access  to
essential services and cut off  from the new mechanisms of  representation, and, as a
consequence, are no longer capable of  asserting their rights and thereby continuing to
identify  with  the  culture  and  symbols  of  the  state.  In  the  third  phase,  those  same
disenfranchised masses are destined to reconsider parasitic forms of  participation based
on patron-client relationships, if  not violent and sectarian forms of  association. Finally,
in  the  fourth  phase,  there  is  a  return  to  violence-based  private  forms  of  resource
accumulation and allocation.
It  is  worth  noting  that  this  kind  of  process  is  also  destined  to  undermine  the
traditional  relationships  between  the  centre  and  the  periphery  of  the  international
system. In contrast to the past, in which great powers and centres tended to coincide,
today the proliferation of  non-state actors—both legal (multinational corporations) and
illegal  (OCGs  and  terrorist  groups)—who  are  in  a  position  to  exercise  significant
powers and make decisions that are relevant to the rest of  the world, tends to create
new  galaxies  and  new  centre-periphery  constellations  (Hall  and  Biersteker,  2002;
Josselin and Wallace, 2001). Also, even the directionality tends to become variable; and
the peripheries, which are no longer completely controlled by, nor dependent on, the
centres,  take  their  revenge.  An  example  is  the  current  dependence  of  developed
countries on the energy resources possessed by peripheral nations that are no longer in
any way bound by the loyalty at one time imposed by the Cold War. Or, to cite an
example  more  in  line  with  the  present  discussion,  the  threat  exercised  by  terrorist
networks and OCGs, which move in the direction of  the greater centres of  power and
global  capitalism from economically  and  politically  marginal  areas.  Above all,  these
groups  become  carriers  of  cultures—whether  of  the  religious  fundamentalism  of
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terrorists or the honour codes of  criminals—that are in clear contrast with the declared
values of  the democratic regimes which govern in the countries of  the canter. 
Long before the 1989 fall of  the Berlin Wall, OCGs had existed in a considerable
number of  states and enjoyed enormous profits from illicit  trafficking. However,  the
process  of  globalisation  and  the  end  of  the  Cold  War  have  created  a  particularly
advantageous  context  that  explains  the  exponential  and  truly  global  expansion  of
criminal power over the last twenty years. On the one hand, the deregulation of  the
financial markets and their privatisation offers OCGs almost unlimited opportunities for
recycling and reinvesting the proceeds from illegal trafficking. On the other hand, this
occurs during a phase of  unprecedented growth in the demand for illicit  goods and
services. The transition of  the former communist countries such as republics of  the
Soviet Union and China to a market economy has benefited all business and financial
sectors  that  function within the  law,  but  for  OCGs this  opening represented  a  new
market for illicit goods (mainly, though not only, drugs) as well as a boundless source of
human and material recourses (Volkov, 2002). 
If  these aspects give OCGs an advantage as a global player, the deconstruction of
the state magnifies OCGs’ potential on a local level. First, the deconstruction of  the
state  means  the  possibility  of  the  appropriation  of  territorial  resources  for  OCGs.
Second, it offers a new identity and a sense of  belonging, as well as a form of  welfare to
those who accept to join, or simply collaborate with criminal organisations. It is upon
this  second  aspect—  OCGs  as  a  local  player—that  the  next  section  of  the  paper
concentrates on.
The crime-building process
OCGs’ competitiveness is based on its ability to imitate and adapt premodern models to
the demand of  a new reality. In fact, the original basis of  OCGs is to be found in a type
of  organisation that is far older than the state: the clan (Weiner, 2013). Clans are defined
as social units,  whose members are bound by a form of  solidarity grounded on the
recognition of  common ties. It is certainly not a coincidence that mafia organisations—
the example of  OCGs which mainly and most explicitly draw from this model—came
into being in contexts, where the extended family is still a necessary, but not sufficient
condition (Armao, 2000). Consanguinity or blood relationship is not an indispensable
element in today’s criminal organisations, however. In some cases,  kinship can act as an
element of  group cohesion or as a stabilising factor in moments of  crisis. Moreover, the
fact that mafia bosses might adopt strategies typical of  the old monarchies and make use
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of  endogamic or exogamic marriages as a means of  reinforcing control of  the clan or
widening its sphere of  influence, should not come as a surprise.
Another  aspect  that  OCGs  draw  from  their  past  historical  experience  is  the
structure  of  their  own  “administrative  apparatus”.  The  clan  organisation,  in  fact,
emulates that of  secret or pseudo-initiatory societies (Guénon,  2001). The control of
access  to  the  organisation  during  the  recruitment  phase  and  the  relative  lack  of
permeability between different clans are the factors that help guarantee the survival of
OCGs: a clan must be able to defend itself  from eventual infiltration by enemies. The
secretive character of  pseudo-initiatory societies produces two main consequences: one
purely internal, and another related to interaction with the surrounding environment.
The first consequence refers to the distinction between the hierarchy of  roles (chain of
command) and the hierarchy of  knowledge (levels of  awareness or understanding) or
access to organisational secrets. While a role with the organisation might be temporary
and appear to be determined by a certain degree of  randomness (any number of  events
may  influence  whether  a  position  in  the  hierarchy  is  won  or  lost),  the  level  of
knowledge is a permanent acquirement and is far more significant (Guénon,  2001). This
is  especially  true  for  the  external  relationship,  from  which  OCGs  cannot  exclude
themselves, neither during the brutally predatory phases of  pillage and plunder of  the
territory, nor when they respond to the demand for illicit goods and services. 
The second consequence is that the nature of  secret societies makes interactions
with non-members possible only within a “grey zone” of  collusion, corruption, or direct
intimidation (Armao, 2000). Difficult though it may be to define—and, for this reason,
under-investigated by the social sciences—the existence of  the grey zone is not only
empirically observable in any investigation on OCGs, but also raises two issues which
merit more attention. The first is that the presence of  OCGs in a specific territory tends
to alter the normal dynamics of  the political and economic systems by fuelling unfair
competition practices—i.e., by offering politicians the possibility of  guaranteed victory
in  elections  through  the  purchasing  of  votes,  and  businessmen  the  possibility  of
operating in a controlled and non-competitive market. The second issue is of  a juridical
nature, and it is linked to the objective difficulty of  building criminal cases for offences
of  an associative character and for which, far too often, it is impossible to find evidence
that will stand up to scrutiny in a court of  law. It is well-known that OCGs may very
easily intimidate witnesses. But more relevant is the fact that coping with these kinds of
crimes within a legal framework means calling into question the true cornerstones of
democracy:  the  principle  of  individual  criminal  responsibility  and  the  principle,
according to which punishment should be proportional to the crime committed. How to
evaluate the role played by an individual in a crime perpetrated by a clan, and how to
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make provisions for punishment in the absence of  corpus delecti remain open to debate
(Ferrajoli, 1989).
The increased competitiveness of  OCGs (as opposed to the state) in the context of
capitalism appears quite evident. It has already been observed that the unique nature of
OCGs resides in their ability to unite the idea of  local dominion with the globalising
logic of  the colonisation of  new domains beyond the borders of  their home territories.
This model of  development translates into a process characterised by alternating phases
of  entrenchment and expansion: the clan takes form in a specific territorial context, but
once  its  power  has  been  consolidated,  it  looks  to  establish  new  settlements.  First
perhaps in adjacent regions, and then in different countries or even on other continents.
Both these phases might be further subdivided into two stages: 
1.  entrenchment (territorial conquest):
a. legitimisation through violence: clans install themselves in a determined area,
delimiting the borders through the use of  force in a process that recalls the old
practice of  enclosure;
b. legitimisation through consensus: the mere use of  extortionist violence leaves
space for the creation of  patron-client networks, and even an ample social base
which shares the aims and spirit (if  not exactly the methods) of  the clan;
2.  expansion (projection of  power):
a. commercial colonisation: clans essentially plan their movements on the basis
of  “investment” opportunities created by market dynamics, entrusting to a few
associates the management of  their “representations” abroad;
b. settlement colonisation: clans establish themselves in a determined territory,
blending  in  with  members  of  their  same  ethnic  group,  with  the  intent  of
reproducing  in  this  new  place  the  mechanisms  of  intensive  exploitation
developed in the motherland. 
There are two basic advantages associated with the particular mode of  development
used by clans.  The  first  is  the  ability  to  guarantee  the  uninterrupted and intensive
extraction of  resources from the territory. Especially when faced with economic crisis
and a lack of  liquidity, clans seem to be better placed than the state to guarantee the
“original accumulation” of  resources due to the fact that they control small territories
and have no scruples about the use of  violence. The second advantage, linked to clans’
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ability to travel and continually create new settlements is the ability to facilitate the
circulation of  goods and money even across vast distances.
Organised crime clusters
Alternating  processes  of  entrenchment  and  expansion  describe  the  trend  (and  the
general) lines of  the development of  OCGs. It is worth repeating, however, that the
ability of  clans to adapt to the territorial context in which they operate as well as to the
different contingencies of  the market explains why the capitalist system may perceive
them as more competitive players than the state. In fact, there are at least four factors
that positively impact OCGs’ competitiveness: a)  invisibility, or the ability to conceal
both clan members  and clan business  (as  well  as  clan profits);  b)  dynamism, or the
existence of  a growing number of  “variable geometry”  organisations able to offer a
wide variety  of  highly  specialised  services,  as  well  as  adapt  rapidly  to  new market
demands (an example is OCGs’ entrance into the market of  toxic waste disposal); c)
profitability, that is the involvement in sectors (mainly, though not exclusively, illegal)
which guarantee ample profit margins even in low technology sectors (the production
and traffic of  drugs or diamonds, for example); and d) social irresponsibility, that is the
fact  that  the  clans  do  not  have  to  answer  to  anyone  for  their  own  entrepreneurial
choices, nor for the methods they use to implement them. 
The hypothesis put forth here is  that OCGs increasingly tend to function like a
business operating within a cluster. That is a group of  integrated and geographically
proximate  companies  and  associated  institutions,  interconnected  by  a  variety  of
externalities (Porter, 1990 and 2003; Fujita at al., 1999). A corollary to this hypothesis
suggests that criminal clusters develop systemic relationships with other players present
in the same area of  settlement in the same way as industrial clusters. In the case of
OCGs,  this  may mean not  only  clans  belonging to  other  criminal  clusters  but  also
businesses that operate in the legitimate market, as well as political representatives with
whom  the  clans  develop  relationships.  The  second  corollary  is  that,  just  as  some
industrial clusters tend to branch out beyond their national borders, some clans create
transnational networks and agreements with other OCGs in other countries for better
fulfil their aims (Wixted, 2009; Pitelis et al., 2006).
Organised crime clusters may be classified according to two criteria: 1) their degree
of  structuralisation;  and  2)  their  life  cycle.  On  the  basis  of  the  degree  of
structuralisation displayed, it is possible to distinguish between pure agglomerations,
social networks,  and political complexes.  Pure agglomerations are characterised by a
relatively  fragmented  and  unstable  structure.  They  do  not  present  any  particular
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obstacles (beyond the minimal requirements necessary to guarantee group security) to
new members; nor do they waste much time investigating admission requisites. Social
networks  emphasise  trust  and  group  values  as  the  discriminating  criteria  for
membership (rejecting, therefore, any form of  opportunism), requesting only that their
members make their relationships and competencies available to the group. In this way
they strengthen the barriers to admission and reinforce the organisation while avoiding
the adoption of  rigidly hierarchical models which could limit their expansion. Finally,
political  complexes  tend  to  assume  a  stable,  strong,  and  institutionalised  pyramidal
structure.  This  type  of  cluster  imposes  exclusive  membership  on  its  associates,
narrowing both the criteria for entrance into the group, and the opportunities for exit
from it (Gordon and McCann, 2000).
The second criteria to consider in the analysis of  criminal clusters is a life cycle.
Many  OCGs  demonstrate  a  strong  propensity  for  institutionalisation,  while  others
suffer a regressive process of  decline at times accelerated by the appearance of  new,
more aggressive and dynamic players. In general, we may assume that criminal clusters,
like industrial clusters, are subject to a development model which comprises four phases
(Wolfe and Lucas, 2005: 6-8). The first phase, latency, is distinguished by the presence
in a determined territory of  conditions favourable to the birth of  a particular kind of
organised violence  (a  large recruitment  reservoir  from which new members  may be
enlisted); social groups which can supply the necessary basis for consent; and political
and economic players eager to take advantage of  the opportunities created by the new
cluster. The second phase,  development, may be described as the moment in which a
given group asserts itself  through its initiative, resourcefulness, and audacity. Under
these circumstances, the use of  direct violence legitimises the cluster’s claim to power
and governance in the settlement area. The third phase, institutionalisation, foresees the
gradual reduction of  conflict made possible by the consolidation of  relationships with
other political and economic players present in the area, and through the accumulation
of  financial resources sufficient enough to ensure the survival of  the organisation. The
fourth  phase,  transformation,  highlights  the  cluster’s  ability  to  adapt  to  market
exigencies,  modifying  and  renovating  its  organisation  and  governing  strategies,  if
necessary,  or,  conversely,  evidencing  the  cluster’s  tendency  toward  immobility  and
deterioration.
Like  all  classifications,  this  categorisation  of  organised  crime  clusters  tends  to
identify  ideal  model  types.  In  real  life,  of  course,  we  may  find  cases  that  combine
elements  from different  ideal  types;  or  we may witness  a  cluster  in  transition with
regard to its degree of  structuralisation or life cycle. Also, it must be noted that no
classification category should be considered superior to any other. It would be a mistake,
for example, to always presume to attribute a greater degree of  market efficiency and
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functionality to a criminal cluster that has reached the level of  a highly institutionalised
political  complex.  The  winning strategy  in  this  game is  the  one that,  case-by-case,
reveals  itself  to  be  most  compatible  with  input  received  from  the  surrounding
environment,  in  an  endless  game  of  action  and  reaction,  and  reciprocal  influence
(Wendt, 1999). For instance, there is no doubt that in the urban context of  a city like
Palermo (in the homeland of  Sicilian mafia), the totalitarian control of  the territory
guaranteed by a political complex like Cosa Nostra has historically shown itself  to be
the best solution (from the point of  view of  the criminals, obviously). But in the slums
of  the  developing  world’s  modern megacities,  it  is  plausible  that  a  criminal  cluster
which  takes  the  form  of  a  social  network  may  reveal  itself  to  be  more  effective,
especially if  it demonstrates the ability to adapt to changes imposed by an environment
in constant transformation. On the other hand, in the rural and widely dispersed zones
of  cocaine or heroin production a pure criminal agglomeration (perhaps one that is still
in  the  latency phase  of  development)  can be  enough to  guarantee  the  coordination
necessary for the violent expropriation of  territorial resources. On the basis of  the last
consideration, we must expect that OCGs can utilise different cluster models in their
home  territory  and  in  areas  of  new  settlement.  The  radical  differences  (political,
economic, and even cultural) which may exist between these two kinds of  territory fully
justify the adoption of  entrenchment and expansionist strategies that change on a case-
by-case basis—a fact confirmed by the first studies in the field (Sciarrone,  2009; Varese,
2011).
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Conclusion: a road map for future research
By combining the variables of  structuralisation and life cycle we obtain a matrix-like
table in which the examples of  different OCGs can be inserted. 
This table may be put to static use to capture,  for example,  the situation of  several
different organisations at a specific moment in history; or to dynamic use, for instance to
trace  the evolution of  single groups over time. This figure does not pretend to be
exhaustive; rather, it should be understood as a conceptual map. OCGs examples are
presented purely for illustrative purposes, while the arrows are meant to suggest some
possible research hypotheses: for example, the possibility that a criminal cluster may
begin as a pure agglomerate and subsequently follow an evolution along that same axis;
or, instead, undergo the kind of  structural development that pushes it in the direction of
a  social  network  or  even  a  political  complex.  The  progress  might  be  even  more
discontinuous, represented graphically by a sinusoidal shape. But one fact is fairly sure:
as we can infer from the direction of  the arrows, once the clan has reached a certain
degree of  structuralisation, it is rare to see it undergo an inversion of  the process that
would threaten all of  the advantages it has gained (for example, in terms of  its ability
to influence state political activity or infiltrate the legal economy). Instead, it may be
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possible to witness a group’s decline,  caused by its inability to adapt to the changes
demanded by the  market  or by  the  appearance of  more aggressive  and competitive
clans.
The table also suggests the importance of  avoiding all of  the different forms of
reductionism and determinism that have characterised the study of  OCGs for too long.
From this point of  view, further research should use the analysis of  one specific cluster
in its territory of  origin as its point of  departure, as occurs in empirical studies of
industrial  clusters.  Furthermore,  cluster  organisations  might  be  observed  both  in
between  clans  of  the  same  OCGs,  and  in  between  clans  of  different  OCGs.
Consequently,  the proposed model elaborated in this research note might be used to
explain the structure and evolution of  different groups such as Cosa Nostra, the Sinaloa
Cartel, and Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), as well as the synergies and conflicts that can
develop between different “firms” which operate in the same sector and in the same area.
Furthermore, following OCGs through their processes of  entrenchment and expansion
means,  on  a  practical  level,  drawing  on  contributions  from  all  areas  of  the  social
sciences:  from history  and  sociology  to  anthropology  and  social  psychology  for  an
understanding of  OCGs emergence and development in their territory of  origin; and
from economics to geography and area studies for an explanation of  the dynamics of
globalisation.
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